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STATE OF UTAH 
B R I G H A M G.. HOLBROOK and 
BETTY HOLBROOK, his wife, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
WILLIAM M. HODSON and ROSE B. 
HODSON, his wife, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
11767 
'Dhis was an action for specific performance of a con-
tract for sale of apartment house and adjoining duplex in 
SaI,t Lake City, Utah, based on an Earnest Money Receipt 
and Agreement. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court held ,specific performance not ap-
propriate and awarded damages in the form of return of 
earnest money deposit down payment from escrow, $800.00 
per month for one year, value of washer-dryer, attorney's 
fees and interest. 
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NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversa1l of the judgment of the Dis-
trict Court that the contract was sufficiently certain to be 
enforceable, of the judgment that appellants were in de-
fault :by refusal to perform and new rtrial in the calculation 
of damages and in denying the motion for new trial. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
Plaintiff, Brigham Holbrook, before December, 1966, 
was contacted by A. W. Collins, a reail estate salesman, and 
engaged his assistance in locating an apartment house 
with vacant land which he could improve (R. 121, 166). 
Collins was acquainted with defendants' property known 
as the Scarsdale on Ninth East in Salt Lake City with ad-
joining property on which a duplex was constructed and 
sought a listing agreement from defendants (R. 141 & 
164). William M. Hodson alone signed the listing agree-
ment for a limited period to sell the Scarsdale and the ad-
joining duplex together at a price of $160,000.00 (Exhibits 
,P..22 and 3). Collins woI"ked out a tentative agreement on 
the Earnest Money Receipt form signed by the parties rin 
December, 1966, (Exhibit D-15). Collins testified it was 
necessary to re-write this agreement because "Mr. Hodson 
wanted more security before he would su'bordinate" (R. 
168) .. 
Collins ithen prepared another earnest money agree-
ment of which three differing copies were put in evidence 
as Exhibits P-14, D-13 and P-1. These were all part of a 
set with carbon copies (R. 199) and it appears that the 
white is the original copy, rthe pink is the second copy 
which came from the possession of defendants (R. 150, 
201) and the yellow is a copy which came from the posses-
sion of the plaintiffs (R. 90) of which copies were made 
and attached to the complaint and copies of the complaint 
(R. 90). 'The differences in the three copies are that in 
P-14 the initials "WMH" appear opposite Line 21 where 
there are deletions, which initials do not appear on D-13 
or P-1. The deletion of a portion of Line 21 is the same on 
EJChtbits P-14 and D-13 but simply has a line through that 
portion on P-1. On P-14 and D-13 there is an in-
sert above the words "The seller agrees to subordinate" 
with the insert indicated following the word "subordinate" 
which insert is then crossed out and on P-1 there is neither 
rthe insert, rthe indication of the insert nor the crossing out 
of the insert. 
E:xihibit D-1'5, as to the matter of subordination, pro-
vides at Line 50: "Seller agrees to subordinate to buyers 
when buyers show financial ability to build a minimum 
eighteen additional units." which has a line through it and 
also provides at Lines 21 and 22: ''at time of subordina-
tion seller agrees to convey deed to duplex" from which 
there has been lined out "at time of subordination" and 
at Line 22 it is then provided "upon receipt of balance due 
against duplex." 
In Exhibit P-1 at Line 21 it is provided: "The seller 
agrees to subordinate and in consideration the buyer agrees 
to give a fir.st mortgage on a United States lease post office 
building located at 100 St. Joseph Boulevard, Trenton, 
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Michigan. Income on lease is approximately $6,600.00 a 
year whioh buyer will assign to be used only in case of de-
fault." with other provision in the lower part of the con-
tract as to the mortgage on the Michigan property. On all 
three copies of this. December 28, 1966 earnest money, the 
words: "When buyer wishes to build additional units" are 
crossed out in Line 21. The 'language of the insert aibove 
Line 21 has been made illegible on Exhibits D-13, P-14 and 
P-12. Mrs. Hodson testified that it related to building units 
on :the dupl,ex lot (R. 7 and 200). 
Mr. Collins testified that the initials "W.M.H." at left 
of Line 21 of Exhibit P-14 were placed on the exhibit by 
Mr. Hodson (R. 160). Mr. and Mrs. Hodson both testified 
that those are not his initials and that Mr. Collins put 
them on after Mrs. Hodson had signed the earnest money 
agreements, following the signature by her husband (R. 
142, 201, 202). 
In other respects there isn't much controversy about 
the Earnest Money Receipt and Off er to Purchase. The 
buyers offered $147,000.00 with $17,000.00 down for the 
Scarsdale Apartments and the duplex to the south with ap-
pliances and furniture with reference to a first mortgage 
on the property in Trenton, Michigan. The sellers made a 
counter-off er providing for first mortgage on the building 
jn Michigan with an assignment of lease and clear title in 
the Holbroofus and for release of the mortgage when the 
contract "is reduced to $100,000.00 on rtJhe apartment house 
at 125 South 9th East and the duplex at 135 South 9rth 
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East 1Street, both located in Salt Lake City, Utah." raising 
the purchase price 1lo $1'50,000.00 wiith $20,000.00 down. 
The defendants then consulted an attorney who wrote 
a letter to the brokers on January 11, 1967 (Exhibit D-7) 
commenting on a Eistate Agreement" marked Exlhibit 
D-6 and suggesting a number of additions to and changes 
in the proffered contracts. 
The plaintiffs signed a "Real Estate Sale Agreement" 
dated January 19, 1967 (Exhibit P-4) which was submitted 
to defendants and their attorney along with the attached 
papers which are a copy of proposed mortgage from the 
Holbrooks to the Hodsons, a proposed seller's isettlement 
statement, a proposed "Assignment of Leases and Rents," 
a commitment for title insuTance on the Michigan property 
from Burton Abstract and Title Company, a copy of escrow 
instructions signed by the Holbrooks, a Warranty Deed 
signed by the Hodsons and not acknowledged and a pro-
posed Bill of Sale for the Hod.sons to execute covering fur-
niture in the apartment house and the duplex. 
In response rto this submitted oontract with attach-
ments the defendants caused a letter to be written to the 
brokers January 21, 1967 (Exhibit D-9) purporting to 
point out several inconsistencies between the submitted 
Real Estate Contract and the Earnest Money Agreement 
and suggesting that the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer 
ito Purchase is too indefinite to be enforceabfo and submit-
'ting a Uniform Real Estate Contract with "Addendum" 
from the Earnest Money Receipt signed by the defendants 
(Exhibit D-8). 
This was followed by a letter from the buyers' attor-
ney daJted February 10, 1967 (Exhibit D-10), proposing a 
definition of "subordinate" and demanding closing of the 
transaction on rt!hat definition. 
In response to this letter, attorneys for the defendants 
dispatched a letter dated February 16, 1967 (Exhibit D-11) 
and again proposing that Exhibit D-8, the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract with "Addendum," as submitted with the 
letter of January 21, be the basis for clooing rthe transac-
tion and offering to cooperate. 
The plaintiffs went to Mexico for five weeks leaving 
the latter part of February (R. 109 and 137). In the latter 
part of March or the first part of April, the defendants 
proceeded to remove the duplex from the property and 
construct an additional apartment house on the lot where 
the duplex had been (R. 138 and 145), the progress of 
which was known to the plaintiffs ( R. 138) . The Earnest 
Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase was recorded by the 
brokers on August 8, 1967 (Exhibit P-14) and the com-
plaint was filed December 13, 1967, seeking Bpecific per-
formance and damages or alternatively damages plus at-
torney's fees and attaching a copy of the Earnest Money 
Receipt and Off er to Purchase which appears to be in fact 
a copy of Exhibit P-1 (R. 16 to 18). 
The answer of defendants pleads that the Earnest 
Money Receipt is too vague, uncertain and indefinite to be 
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capable of specific performance or to be the basis of any 
cause of action, pleading laches, denying breach of the 
agreement by the def end ants or refusal to go forward and 
pleading that defendants offered to close the transaction 
in rthe exact wording of Exhibit A and that after a reason-
able time, they had proceeded to remove the duplex and 
construct new units on that location (R. 19 to 21). 
The case was tried before the Honorable Stewart M. 
Hanson on January 16 and 17, 1969 resulting in a mem-
orandum decision dated January 20, 1969 (R. 22 and 23). 
The memorandum decision finds the contract "abso-
lutely clear and definite," that plaintiffs are not estopped 
but are entitled to damages for $20,000.00 paid on the con-
tract, $444.00 for the washer and dryer insta:lled, $160.30 
closing expenses, damages of $9,600.00 being $800.00 per 
month for one year, together with interest on all of the 
said sums and a reasonable attorney's fee. 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
were signed by the Court January 24, 1969, mailed out by 
the Clerk, January 27, 1969 ( R. 2'5 to 30) with Mortion for 
a New Trial being filed February 6, 1969 (R. 31) which 
attacked the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
The timeliness of ithe Motion for New Trial has been 
before the Court previously and will not be considered in 
this brief, although the cross-appeal of the plainrtiffo chal-
lenges the timeliness as well as the sufficiency of the dam-
ages awarded (R. 49) .. 
POINTS RELIED ON 
For Reversal of the Trial Court 
1. The Earnest Money Receipt is so uncertain and 
indefinite as to be unenforceable. 
2. Pla!intiffs made no tender in accordance with the 
Earnest Money Receipt. 
3. Defendants did not breach the Earnest Money Re-
ceipt agreement. 
In Support of Motion for New Trial 
4. The damages awarded are not supported by the 
evidence. 
5. Defendants are not clhargeable with foss of the 
washer and dryer. 
6. The initials on Exhibit P-14 are not the initials of 
defendant William M. Hodson. 
7. The brokers were the agents of p1aintif fs contrary 
to Finding of Fact No. 7. 
8. Finding of Fact No. 8 is in error in finding that 
the plaintiffs submitted the required papers on January 
19, 1967. 
9. Finding of Fact No .. 9 is in error in finding that 
monthly profit from the apartment hom;e was $800.00. 
ARGUMENT 
1. The earnest money receipt is so uncertain and in-
definite as to be unenforceable. 
Defendants, being willing all the time to proceed with 
the transaction, endeavored to obtain a clarification of cer-
tain portions of the contract before concluding that tJhe only 
possibility for closing was to close the contract in the lan-
guage of the Earnest Money Receipt or else to accede to the 
pla:intiffs' interpretations and changes contained in its of-
fer which is Exhibit P-4. 
In Exhibits D-7, D-9 and D-11 defendants raised ques-
tions as to uncertainty and indefiniteness. These were : If 
subordination were required would it be as to all of the 
properity or the duplex only and on how much ground; what 
would be the use of the funds raised 'tJhrough the sU:bordina-
tJion provision; if improvements were to be made on the 
properties being sold, would the Hodsons have any right of 
objection to the plans; was any money to be raiBed for this 
transaction on the Michigan property; what would the 
terms of subordination be; was the Michigan mortgage to 
'be recorded or placed in escrow; was it intended that the 
application of the term "subordinate" and "mortgage" as 
applied to rthis transaction would be worked out by the 
parties in a Uniform Real Estate Contract or be left for 
interpretation by a court? 
It was plain from the testimony of the parties con-
cerning ithe deletions and the change from Exhibit D-15 
to Exhibit P-1, that the parties had discussed :with the real 
estate agent the matters of what property was to be sub-
ordinwted to other money, what the proceeds of the first 
lien were to be used for and how the Michigan property 
could be used as additional security in some manner. And 
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the Earnest Money Agreement contemplated that it would 
be superseded by a further contract. These further clari-
fications could presumably include the amount of money 
to be raised to which the Hodsons would subordinate, the 
terms of re-payment of that money, the use of the money 
to be raised and the type of improvemeruts, if any, which 
were to be made on the property being sold, and how the 
security of the Michigan property was to relate to the pay-
ment of the original contract and to the payment of the 
debt to which there would be subordination. Mr. Hodson 
very appropriately negatived the notion that he .would re-
ceive $11,000.00 on a $150,000.00 transaction and giive a 
deed and then run the risk that further financing would 
jeopardize his $130,000.00 equity with no protection wh:aJt-
soever as to how the money would be used, what it would 
do to his property, and whether he would end up with any-
thing except a $50,000.00 property in Michigan to ta.Ike the 
place of his $130,000.00 balance (R. 136). 
These matters of uncertainty and indefiniteness were 
such that the contract was not specifioally enforceable and 
plaintiffs' remedy was to seek relief for unjust enrichment 
of the defendants, if any. 
In Kessler v. Sapp (Cal. Ct. of App. 1959) 338 Pac. 
2d 34, 37, the Court ruled that a contract for the purchruse 
of unimproved property for ,subdivision purposes was too 
indefinite to support an action for specific performance 
where the escrow instructions provided for subordination 
of a trust deed to a first trust to be obtained by purchasers, 
and only the amount was determinable from the contract. 
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The rate of interest, :the amount of monthly payments and 
the period of debt were 1eft to future agreement of the 
parties. As to the agreement to subordinate the deed of 
trust to a first truist deed for ,a construction loan, the Court 
stated: 
"The escrow instructions of January 20 provided 
for the subordination of a trust deed to a first trust 
deed to be obtained by the purchasers, only one 
term of the contemplated deed of trust was set out 
in the instructions, namely, that the amount of en-
cumbrance was not to exceed $6.50 per square foot, 
'exclusive of garages, stairways and porches,' * * * 
the rate of interset, the amount of monthly pay-
ments and the period of the debt were left to future 
agreement of the parties. This radical uncertainty 
as to a material feature of sales agreement not only 
rendered it incapable of specific performance 
(Gould v. Cal"lan, 127 Cal. App. 2d, 1, 273 Pac. 2d 
93) but also rendered unmaintainable an action for 
damages for its breach. Burgess v. Rodom, 12 Cal. 
App. 2d 71, 262 Pac. 2d 335." 
The Court, however, found a claim had been stated for 
unjust enrichment and said that a purchaser who has paM 
a portion of the purcihase price under contract for sale of 
real prope:rity, which is void for uncertainty, may recover 
his payments in accordance with assumpsit citing Poetker 
v. Dyck, 83 Cal. App. 771, 257 Pare. 185; Harwell v. Rein-
inger, 1123 Cal. App. 485, 11 Pac. 2d 421. The Court re-
marked that with respect to 1$4,000.00 spent by plaintiff in 
obtaining the approval of a subdivision plan, such expendi-
tures were not recoverable. The Cou:rit remarked that as 
a general rule a purchaser who is entitled to restitution 
may, in addition to the sum paid on a void contract, recover 
the reasonable value of any improvements made, or services 
rendered pursuant to the agreement which are a material 
benefit to the vendor. Restatement of Restitution, Section 
53, Williston on Contracts, Revised Edition, Vol. 5, p. 4133 
(Section 1479), 92 CJS Vendor and Purchaser, paragraph 
571, p. 611. The Court said that services rendered by the 
vendee which did not benefit the vendor were not recover-
able. 
House v. Lala (Ct. of App. 1960), 4 Cal. Rptr. 366, 
inviolved a preliminary agreement providing for a second 
trust deed of $1,500.00. The Court said that uncertainty as 
to the terms and conditions of the trust deed, including ab-
sence of rate of interest, length of time it was to run, and 
terms of payment, are fatal to a claim for specific 
ance. The Court also observed that unsigned escrow in-
structions do not modify an agreement or make certain 
that which "Tas hitherto uncertain. 
In Mueller v. Chandler (Ct. of App. 1963), 31 Cal. 
Rptr. 646, the defendant appealed from a decree of specific 
performance of an alleged agreement to encumber prop-
erty. The decree was reversed because the writing relied 
on was uncertain. 
"The writing fails to mention the nature of any ad-
ditional document which is to be executed, whether 
it is a mortgage or trust deed or what any of the 
terms of the mortgage or trust deed may be; there 
is not even a statement that a mortgage or trust 
deed will be executed, but merely ithat rthe note 
'may be recorded against my property.' " 
The Court relied on 81 CJS Specific Performance, 
paragraph 31 (a), pp. 480-483, and paragraph 31 (b), pp. 
486-487, from which it quoted. 
Similar California cases denying specific performance 
for such uncertainty and indefiniteness as exists in the 
principal case are: Magna Development Co. v. Reid (Ct. 
of Appeals 1964), 39 Cal. Rptr. 284, 288; Roven v. Miller 
(Cail. Ot. of App. 1959), 335 'P. 2d 1035, 1040; Gould v. 
Callan, 127 Cal. App. 2d, 4-5, 273 P. 2d 93; Conley v. Tate, 
38 Cal. Rpitr. 680. 
Howard v. Beavers, 128 Colo. 541, 264 P. 2d 858, 861, 
involved a contract to e:xd1ange parcels of real estate with 
a mortgage to be given for the difference, the statement of 
terms and times of payment of the difference being incom-
plete, so that the mortgage was found so indefinite that the 
oontract could not be specifically enforced, with this state-
ment: 
''If there had been a mortgage prepared according 
to the terms of the contract, then it would have been 
a document silent as to the time and terms of pay-
ment, therefore there was nothing ito this contract 
that could be carried into a mortgage as, if, and 
when it might have been given." 
The Court cited Restatement of Contracts, Section 32, 
Williston on Contracts, Third Edition, Vol. 1, Section 37, 
in 1support of denial of specific performance and then found 
that there was a breach of contract because the defendant 
refused to perform and granted $36.00 damages incurred 
by the plaintiff in viewing the premises. 
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Nolon v. Grim, 67 Idaho 13·8, 1713 1P. 2d 74. A lease 
gave the lessee a purchase option by written instrument, 
requiring a $1,000.00 check as down payment on a total 
price of $35,000.00 "upon the execution ru a deed convey-
ing the place to me and the delivering of a mortgage to the 
sellers of $23,000.00". It was held unenforceable for un-
certainty as to the mortgage. 
In Kusky v. Berger, 225 N. Y. Supp. 2d 797, specific 
performance of a contract to lease was denied 1Where the 
agreement obligaited the lessee to subordinate the property 
to a first mortgage, but made no provision concerning the 
interest rate. It provided tJhat a more formal agreement 
would be subsequently executed. The Court held that since 
a material element was omitted, in that there could be no 
implication that the mortgage was to be at the fogal rate, 
the corutract was not specifica:lly enforceable. 
See also Grooms v. Willi.ams, 227 Md. 165, 175 A. 2d 
575; Salisbury v. Tibbetts (CCA 10), 259 Fed. 2d 59; Cl,ark 
V. George, 120 Utah 350, 234 P. 2d 844; Banks V. Gregory, 
16 Ill. 2d 227, 157 N. E. 2d 12. 
2. Plaintiffs made no tender in accordance with the 
Earnest Money Receipt. 
The trial court found that the plaintiffs were ready, 
willing and able to proceed with the closing of the transac-
tion (Conclusion of Law No. 3, R. 27). We submit that the 
gratuitous statement made in Court that plaintiff was 
"ready, willing and able" (R. 103) must be weighed in 
the lighrt of performance. The only substantial evidence of 
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willingness to perform is contained in Exhibit P-4 dated 
January 19, 1967 and signed by the plaintiffs. Defendants 
responded to this promptly on January 21st by Exhibit D-9 
1which 'States that rthe Exhibit P-4 had just been received 
that day. Exhibit D-9 reaffirms that the defendants "would 
perfurm the terms of the preliminary Earnest Money Re-
ceipt and Offer to Purchase." Exhib'iit D-9 then points out 
the particulars in which Exhibit P-4 does not comply with 
Exhibit P-1, as follows: The mortgage on the Trenton, 
Wayne County, Michigan property had a faulty descrip-
tion; escrow fees are divided and not covered by the Earn-
est Money Agreement; the conditions of performance would 
have to be the conditions of the Uniform Real Estate Con-
tract; hill of sale to the chattels is required by P-4 and not 
by the Earnest Money Receipt; Michigan title insurance 
was only a mortgage commitment for a $50,000.00 mort:. 
gage to an insurance company and nlOt showing any value 
of $130,000.00 and no proviaion for recording the mortgage 
on the Michigan property to protect the defendants. Ex-
tri:bit D-9 also points out that under the usual Uniform 
Real Estate Contract the buyer will commit no destruction 
upon the premises, the Earnest Money Receipt providing 
that when the balance is paid to $100,000.00 there will still 
be a "duplex" on the property. Page 3 of Exhibit P-4 con-
tains a lengthy paragraph as to how the buyer 'intended 
the subordination provision to operate which refers to 
"construction of substantial improvements on the Salt Lake 
City property" and subordination to refinancing, the terms 
of wblicih are not restricted in any manner and then provi-
sion that the promissory note of the buyer complying with 
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the terms of the Earnest Money Agreement, without rela-
tionship to the first lien, would have to be accepted by the 
sellers who would have to "execute such subordination 
agreement as shall be required to declare such priority." 
Exhibit D-11 written in response to the demand of 
plaintiffs' attorney for performance invites the plaintiffs 
to abandon their demands not contemplated by the Earnest 
Money Receipt and close lthe transaction on a Uniform Real 
Estate Contract employing the language from Exhibit P-1 
so as to avoid interpretation of that language. 
In his Memorandum Decision rthe trial judge found 
thait a tender had been made (R. 22). this 
was Exhibit P-4, the disparities of which are pointed out 
above. 
"It is a good defense * * * to show * * * 
that plaintiff has not performed or offered to per-
form his part of 1t'he oontra0t; or, where a demand is 
necessary, that plaintiff has not made any demand; 
or that plaintiff's tender or offer of performance 
was coupled with conditions not authorized by 'the 
contract." C.J.S., Vendor and Purchaser, Para-
.graph 581(a), p. 624. 
This was stated slightly differently in Schmidt v. Barr, 
333 Ill. 494, 165 N. E. 131: 
"The contract must be enforced according to its 
terms or not at all. A court is without auithority 
to compel a party to do something he did not con-
tract to do. * * * A party seeking perform-
ance must show that he has complied with all of the 
terms of the contract at ,the time and in the manner 
therein provided." 
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In Lightall v. McGuire, 20 App.. Div. 248, 46 N. Y. S. 
987, the plaintiff purchaser required delivery of certain 
timber spars before proceeding with his contract to buy 
2,300 1acres of land, as to w.hlich the Courit stated: 
"Upon this single is.sue to which we have adverted 
the jury found in favor of r!Jhe defendant, which, of 
course, defeated the plaintiff's rigiht Ito recover 
damages." 
In Arnold V. Smith (Mo. Supp. Ct. 1969), 436 S. W. 
2d 719, 723, the Court found that the defendant seller 
really did not want to perform his contract and observed 
:that the Court will not rewrite the contract for the parties, 
sayiing: 
"It will require the performance of neither more 
nor less rthan that which the parities themselves 
have agreed to do * * * 'The party who seeks 
relief must show his performance or off er of per-
formance of every eSISential obligation resting upon 
h'im before the other pa:rlty may be compelled to 
perform." 
In General American Life Insurance Co. v. Natchi-
toches Oil Mill (Fil.fth Cir.), 160 F. 2d 140, 144, ithe Court 
reversed a judgment of the district court denying specific 
performance, noting that defendant apparently had decided 
to try to buy the property '"ait a less price than had agreed 
to pay" which attitude the Court said: 
"Cannot be heard as in ref using to accept the ten-
der it sought to do, to question as unwise or in-
judicious the conditions it had agreed to and to 
refuse performance because it now thought they 
were." 
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The Court found it rto be settled law that specific per-
formance requires a contract that is Clear and fair and 
completelly performed by :the parties seeking performance. 
Plaintiffs, in view of 'these principles of law, were re-
quired to bring their lOff er of performance contained in P-4 
in line with the Earnest Money Receipt, in response to the 
questions raised by the defendants as contained 1in Exhibits 
D-7 and D-9 and in response to defendants' final offer of 
performance made on January 21 (Exhibilt D-9) and re-
newed on February 16, 1967 (Exhibit D-11). 
3. Defendants did not breach the Earnest Money Re-
ceipt Agreement. 
The factual basis of 1this argument as extracted from 
Exhibits D-7, D-9 and D-11 has already been stated under 
Point 2. There is not one word of testimony in tJhis record 
to indicate that the defendants were not satisfied wiJth the 
price for the Scarsdale and the adjoining duplex. They 
wanted the transaction to be closed but were fearful of 
losing a $130,000.00 "equity" .through subordination and 
default of the pr\incipal obligation, ending up with a $50,-
000.00 post office in Mic:higan. They had endeavored in 
Exhlbilts D-7 and D-9 to outline a reasonable basis to insure 
that the improvements on the property 1would be real im-
provements, that financing obtained on the property would 
go foto the property and that the first mortgage, the sub-
ordinated lien and the Michigan property would be utilized 
in a way to insure the defendants that they would receive 
their money from the sale contract. 
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Where a contract 1ia accompanied by conflicting inter-
pretations, it is a reasonable solu.ttion th!at one of 1Jhe parties 
off er to perform in the language of the preliminary agree-
ment. This was the purport of Exhibit D-9 dated January 
21. Plaintiffs' then attorney then forwarded Exhibit D-10 
on February 10, which fails 'to comment on D-9 and D-8 
and insists on the plaintiffs' interpretations and claimed 
representations a;s to subordinaJtJion. Exhibit D-11 was 
sent on February 16 in a further effort to resolve conflict 
over the meaning of the word "subordfoate," offering to 
cooperate 'in working out a satisfactory subordination and 
suggesting that if the parties cannot agree, a Court can 
inlterpret the language. 
"But threatening to resort to the courts to esta:blish 
one's rights should not be treated as a breach of 
contraot in the absence of an expressed provision 
to 'that effect." 17 Am. Jur. 2d, ContractB, p. 901, 
citing Didier v. McFadden Publications, Inc., 80 N. 
Y. S. 2d 409, affirmed 79 N. Y. S. 2d 521, affirmed 
299 N. Y. 49, 85 N. E. 2d 612. 
If it be considered that defendants requested a modifi-
cation of the contract, !then the request for modffication is 
likewise not a breach of the contract and could not be so 
treated. Turner v. McCormick, 56 W. Va. 161, 49 S. E. 28, 
32, noted in Note 14 in 17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts, p. 901. 
And in any event, there should have been an explana-
tion by rthe rpla!intiff s of why they regarded the offers of 
performance made by the defendants as being unsatis-
factory ( 17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts, p. 801; Williston on 
Contracts, Rev. Ed. Vol. 6, pp. 5157, 5159) instead of going 
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to Mexico for five weeks a;t the end of February (R. 109, 
137). Defendants interpreted the plaintiffs' silence and 
inaction as an abandonment of the contract and proceeded 
over a period of several months to remove the duplex and 
construct apartments on that ground, all with the knowl-
edge of the plaintiffs (R. 138), who took no step until an 
undisclosed letter was written in June, 1967 (R. 94), and 
Exhibit P-1 was recorded August 7, 1967. 
4. The damages awarded are not supported by the 
evidence. 
This point and the subsequent points were raised in 
the motion for new trial and, if 1sound, would require a 
reversal of the denial of the motion for new trial with a 
consequent new trial. The preceding three points, it is sub-
miitted. require that the judgment of the District Court be 
reversed on the ground that ,the plaintiffs had not estab-
lished their case. 
Finding of Fact No. 9 (R. 26) is that the evidence 
shows a monthly profit of $800.00 from the operation of 
the Scarsdale and Conclusion No. 9 (R. 28) is that reason-
able damaget> "for loss of bargain are assessed as profit 
from the apartment house at $800.00 per month for a per-
iod of one year, or $9,600.00." 
This Findring and Conclusion are contrary to the evi-
dence. 
The Sales Agency contract, Exhibit P-3, lists income 
of the Scarsdale at $12,050.00 per year and expenses of 
$3,966.00 or $8,084.00 net income, which is $67 4.00 per 
month, with nothing off for depreciation or obsolescence. 
The defendants produced Exhibits D-17, D-18 and 
D-19 as befog actual records of income and for 
1967 and 1968. These show that the total income for 1967 
was $9,120.75 and the net income was $3,053.12 after al-
lowing for depreciation and salaries and wages, as shown 
on Exhibit D-18. In examining Mrs. Hodson the plaintiffs 
established the fact that if depreciation and salaries and 
wages were not taken out, the net income would be higher 
(R. 207). That is obvious and would increase the net in-
come to $5,521.95 or less than $500 per month. But that 
is illusory. Ry doing the work of rthe manager and a main-
tenance man, those expenses could be saved as out-of-pocket 
items and by ignorling obsolescence it could be pretended 
that the buildings were not getting older. The net profit 
would not rbhereby be increased, but the plaintiffs could 
have obtained a savings in the form of paper wages to 
themselves by doing that work. 
Then the coum perm[tted Mr. Holbrook to testify, over 
objection, what he though the apartments could have pro-
duced under his management (R. 104-108). He testified to 
$1,200.00 per month, which was more than actual income, 
and figured $400.00 per month expenses, whi0h was less 
than actual expenses. He would have saved salaries by 
operaJting the Scarsdale himself (R. 108) and again he 
would ignore depreciation. His speculations cannot take 
the place of evidence of actual operations contained in Ex-
hibits D-17, D-18 and D-19. 
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But this type of evidence does not establish the value 
of the property. (See 7 ALR 163.) There was no Jtestimony 
by anyone that the properties were worth more or less than 
$150,000.00, the agreed price. 
"Wthere there is no evlidence given showing any 
change in the situation, the agreed consideration 
will be taken as the correct value of lthe land." 55 
Am. Jur., Vendor and Purchaser, p. 951, citing 48 
ALR 72 as supplemented at 68 ALR 152. 
"Only nominal damages are recoverable unles.s there 
is competent proof of the extent of damage, which 
would be the difference be1Jween the actual value 
and the agreed value." 5'5 Am. Jur., Vendor and 
Purchaser, p. 950. 
Recovery of loss of profits or of rents and profits 
during the period of time that property was withheld from 
the purchaser would be reasonable if specific performance 
were aJilowed, since otherwise there would be unjust en-
richment from withholding of the property. 
"Where the breach consists in ithe of the 
vendor to conv·ey at the time agreed upon and his 
continued wrongful detention of the possession from 
the purchaser, a conveyance having been afterward 
made and accepted, rents received by the vendor 
during the /time the control of the property was so 
detained have been held to be recoverable." 55 Am. 
Jur., Vendor and Purchaser, §555, p. 958. 
But that rule is not applicable since specific perform-
ance was not .granted. Plaintiffs were entitled to return 
of ,their money and to rtheir damages, if any, which were 
unjust enrichment of the defendants, but for loss of bar-
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gain would be compelled to show that the actual value of 
the property was greater than the contract price. 
This Court app1lied the general rule of damages be-
tween vendor and vendee where vendor refuses to convey 
in Bunnell V. Bills, 13 Utaih 2d 83, 368 P. 2d 597. In that 
action the buyers sought sipecif,ic performance of a contract 
for purchase iof a motor lodge or alternatively for damages 
for the breach. The trial court denied speciflic performance 
for grounds which are not made plain in the op!i.nion. It 
then aiwarded $'5,000.00 damages for breach of contract on 
the basis of evidence that 1the sale prrice between the parties 
was $1715,000.00 and that the property was sold shortly 
thereafter for $180,000.00, making the difference of $5,-
000.00 as the damages. This Court held: 
''The mea;sure of damages where the vendor has 
breached a land sale contract is the market value of 
the property at the time of the breach 1ess the con-
tract price to the vendee." (p. 88.) 
The Court went on : 
"Where a rule of law has been esta!blished for the 
measurement of damages, !it must be followed by 
ithe finder of fact, and to recover damages plaintiff 
must prove not only that she has suffered a loss, 
but must also prove the extent and amount thereof. 
Furthermore, to :warrant a recovery ba;sed on the 
value of the property there must be proof of its 
value or ev,idence of such facts as will warrant a 
finding of value with reasonable certainty." 
A careful annotation at 48 ALR 12, supplemented at 
68 ALR 137, discusses the elements of damage between 
vendor and vendee in a defaulted land sale contract. It is 
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plarin, and Appellants concede, that if def end ants breached 
the contract the amount paid down is recoverable together 
with interest, and the vendee is also entitled to the benefit 
of his bargain, which is the difference between the value 
of the property and the contract p:riice. 
5. Def end.ants are not chargeable with loss of the 
washer and dryer. 
Brigham Holbrook testified that he placed a washer 
and dryer in the 8carsdaie (R. 111). There is no evidence 
in the record of the cost or value of the washer and dryer 
or their present whereabouts. 
There was testimony that the washer and dryer dis-
appeared in the middle of the night (R. 204), wMch was 
stricken as being hearsay, with no other evidence as to 
what happened to rthe washer and dryer, and specifically 
no testimony thait those appliances were not removed by 
the plaintiff or in Ms behalf. 
The fact fuat the appliances were once on the defen-
dants' propenty and then disappeared does not constitute a 
oause of action in behalf of the plaintiffs. 
There 'is no proof of value; no proof of loos; no proof 
of why these appliances were put :in the Scarsda:le. This 
was a gratuitous 'bailment for the sole ibenefit of bailor. 
CJS Bailment, sec. 9. To hold defendants would require 
proof of gross negligence. CJS, Bailment, sec. 28, p. 418. 
"The bailee sufficiently exonerates himself when he 
shows that the cause of the loss was a mystery." 
CJS, Bailment, sec. 50, p. 527. 
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6. The initials on Exhibit P-14 are not the initials of 
Defendant William M. Hodson. 
This issue was raised by Finding of Fact No. 5: 
"All deletions and changes to the agreement were 
made prior to signing by all parties on December 
29, 1966" (R. 26). 
The witness Collins did testify that the changes were 
made before signing by Mrs. Hodson in the presence of 
Mr. Hodson (R. 160 and 175-176) and that the initials 
"'WMH" were placed to the left of line 21 of Exhibit P-14 
by Mr. Hodson before signing the documenit (R. 160) .. 
Mr. and Mrs. Hodson both testified that lthe initials 
were not those of Mr. Hodson and that they were put on 
by Mr. Collins at the Hodson home following the signatures 
by the Hodsons and without their approval (R. 143, 148, 
150, 201, 202 and 203). 
Thi1s raises an issue o!f fact with a finding supported 
by evidence. It is mentioned here because an examination 
of the !initials on P-14 compared with D-15, which are ad-
mittedly the initia1l1s of Mr. Hodson, plainly shows that the 
initials are in a different style of handwriting. 
The Court was puzzled by the fact that his copy of the 
Earnest Money Receipt did not have an indication for an 
insert above line 21 and follQwing the word "subordinate" 
and did not have the initials at the left-hand margin of line 
21 (R. 151-152). In presenting this to the Court co "'·e1 
stated, "I realize that" (R. 152). 
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This is almost irrefutable proof that vhe fiacts were as 
testified by the Hodsons and that Collins was mistaken. 
The Earnest Money Receipt and Off er to Purchase comes 
in sets (R. 199). The top or white page was produced by 
Callins (R. 159) and was marked Exhibit P-14, the pink 
one (D-13) came from the Hodsons' possession (R. 150) 
and the orange one (Exhibit P-1) from rthe pla:intiffs' (R. 
90) .. Exhibit P-1 does nolt contain the insert aJbove line 21 
or the at the left. That is because, a..s vhe Hodsons 
testified, CoUins obtained Mrs. Hodson's signaiture, which 
shows on aH copies, as of December 29, 1966 and presented 
all copies to the Holbrooks, whose signatures appear again 
below the signatures of the Hodsons and iare dated Decem-
ber 29, 1966. Only two copies (Ex'hi'bits D-13 and P-14) 
hiave the arrows, suggesting an insert, in l1ine 21 after rthe 
word "subordinate", but only the white copy (Exhibit P-14) 
has the insert as crossed out, initial'Ied ·alt 1Jhe left-hand 
margin. Mr. and Mrs. Hodson both rtestified that the in-
itials were .put there by Collins after Mrs. Hodson had 
signed (R. 142, 150, 176 and 201). 
These circumstances confused the Court (R. 151 and 
152) and justifiably so. It is plain that after Mrs. Hodson 
signed the set of papers and the Holbrooks had signed be-
low the Hodsons, rthe orange copy (P-1) was detached. The 
front part of line 21 was crossed out iagain on the other 
two copies. (Tihis wa:s done differently on P-1 and on D-13 
and P-14.) The insert was made 1above line 21; this was 
crossed out; the pink copy was given to the Hodsons (R. 
201) and Collins then put Mr. Hodson's initials on Exhibit 
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P-14 only. The plaintiffs knew nothing about the inserts 
(R. 97, 124). 
And the Court was in error in finding that: 
"'5. All deletions and changes to the agreement 
were made prior to signing by all parties on D'e-
cember 29, 1966" (R. 26). 
7. The brokers were the agents of plaintiffs contrary 
to Finding of Fact No. 7. 
This finding reads : 
"7. On the 11th and 21st days of January, 1967, 
0ounsel for the Hodsons wrote the real estate broker 
reqesting the changes in the Earnest Money Agree-
ment. There is no evidence that the Holbrooks saw 
these letters at that time, but real estate agent Col-
lins did discuss some of the items with Mr. Hol-
brook" (R. 26). 
It is implicit in this Finding of Fact that even though 
the parties had not met during aU of the negotiations, the 
delivery to the agent of both parties wru; not equivalent to 
delivery to the buyers. The Court commented and thereby 
presumably ruled that the real estate broker and salesman 
were the agents of both parties (R. 154). From this it 
:follows thast when the defendants delivered Exhibits D-7 
and D-9 to the real estate agents, the plaintiffs were 
charged wtth knowledge of the contents of those documents. 
The plaintiffs saw the January 11 letter (Exhibit D-7) 
before signing Exhibit P-4 (R. 117), saw Exhibit D-8, 
which was submitted on January 20 (R. 117), and heard 
about problems connected with the Earnest Money Agree-
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ment before January 19 when Exhibit P-4 was signed (R. 
119). It is therefore fairly arguable that plaintiffs were 
informed as to the thinking of defendants and their attor-
ney with ref ere nee to consummating the transaction. 
But even if that were not so, the transmission of Ex-
hibits D-7, D-8, D-9 and D-11 to the brokers imputed the 
contents of those documents to the plaintiffs, according to 
a careful annotation on the subject of notice to dual agents 
appearing in 4 ALR 3rd 224. 
8. Finding of Fact No. 8 is in error in finding that 
the plaintiffs submitted the required /papers on January 
19, 1967. 
Finding No. 8 is that the plaintiffs, among other 
things, "signed the closing papers" and "delivered the re-
quired papers on their Michigan property" (R. 26). This 
matter is covered generally by Point 2. But specifically, to 
refer to documents prepared in behalf of the plaintiffs as 
"the closing papern" is presumptive and inaccurate, inas-
much as the defendants at no time approved the form of 
those papers. Likewise the finding that "the required 
papers" on the Michigan property were delivered is pal-
pably wrong. The mortgage which was delivered was un-
signed and contains no sufficient description and the so-
ctalled title insurance binder is in the amount of $50,000.00 
and shows as mortgagee the Northwestern Mutual Life 
Insurance Company instead of the defendants, and shows 
county taxes for 1965 and 1966 and special assessments 
unpaid. 
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The Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase 
calls for "a first mortgage" on the Michigan property with-
out specifying what the amount of that mortgage will be. 
The mortgage in the amount of $130,000.00 would 
that the Scarsdale property was in effect being abandoned 
by the sellers and that the Michigan property was being 
accepted as full security, although the policy of 1Jrtle insur-
ance indicates a value limited to $50,000.00, with no assur-
ance of a first lien, and the income of the property 
at $6,600.00 a year suggests a value far less than $130,-
000.00 and clooer to the $50,000.00 commitment for the 
Northwestern Mortgage. 
9. Finding of Fact No. 9 is in error in finding that 
monthly profit from the apartment house was $800.00. 
This finding reads : 
"9. Figures taken from the listing agreements, 
the 'testimony of Mr. Ho]brook, and Mr. Hodson'a 
hookis as to rentals and expenses show a monthly 
profit after expenses of operation, including taxes, 
from the apartment house property of $800.00." 
This Finding of Fact is fundamental to the decision 
because that $9,600.00 was the chief ,item of damage. The 
Court's Memorandum Decision stated: 
"The Court is further of the opinion that the plain-
tiffs should be entitled to a judgment of $9,600.00, 
figured at the rate of $800.00 per month for one 
year * * *" (R. 22). 
which became translated into Finding of Fact No. 9. 
As pointed out under Point 4, the listing agreement 
and the books and records plainly show a net profit of far 
less than $800.00. The testimony of Mr. Holbrook was ob-
jected to when he offered to testify to what he thought the 
net profit would have been (R. 105 to 107). So far as rep-
resentation of the sellers were concerned, that is to be 
found on the lis>ting agreement (Exhibit P-3), which shows 
a maximum of $12,050.00 per year income and annual ex-
penses of $3,966.25 or profit before depreciation of $673.50 
per month. 
Actual records of income and expenses were available 
in the form of Exhibits D-17, D-18 and D-19. 
rt was therefore error to receive the testimony of Mr. 
Holbrook and error to use that testimony as the basis of 
Finding of Fact No. 9 in the face of evidence properly re-
ceived. 
"As a rule, evidence of the profits of a business 
conducted on land is inadmissible as evidence of the 
market value of the land." 22 Am. Jur. 2d, Dam-
ages, p. 425. 
"When lost prof.its are an element of recovery in 
an action for breach of contract, all facts relating 
to the subject matter of the contract and concerning 
the execution thereof known to both parties and 
all facts which would reasonably tend rto make cer-
tain the amount of injury inflicted are admissible. 
This may include evidence as to receipts and dis-
bursements for a reasonable period prior to the time 
of 'the injury or destruction of the business and a 
showing of sales made after a breach or injury, if 
such matters would aid in estimating prevented 
gains. Where a regularly established business is 
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!injured, the average profit that the business is then 
earning and has earned are competent proof as to 
the loss of profits. * * * 
"According to some courts, a witness cannot give 
his opinion as to the amount of profits that could 
have been made or that the profits ilost were a 
specified sum * * *" 22 Am. Jur. 2d, Dam-
ages, pp. 430-431. 
Defendants submit first, that if plaintiffs were en-
titled to any damages because of a breach by the defen-
dants, !those damages were the difference between the 
value of the property under contract and the contract price, 
plus expenditures made to the benefit of defendant, or 
reasonably made in preparation of performance. But if 
this Court should hold that loss of profits are recoverable 
then those profits would ltave to be based upon the exper-
ience of business and not the conjecture of plaintiffs, and, 
of course, the value of the plaintiffs' effort in managing 
the business, if different from the wages and salaries paid 
by the defendants during the prior period. 
This actual evidence for the year 1967 was available, 
which was completely ignored by the trial judge in favor 
of the speculative testimony of tthe plaintiffs as to what 
might have been. 
SUMMARY 
The evidence is that the pa:rities and a real estate sales-
man worked over two Earnest Money Receipts and Offers 
to Purchase with the help of in'terlineation.s and cross-outs 
as to which the copies delivered to the two pa:rities were 
d!iff erent. The defendants employed an attorney who at-
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tempted to work out modifications of the iagreement, which 
would make plain their different interpretations and sat-
isf y both parties. This failed and the plainiliff s demanded 
performance according to :their interpr¢ations of the Earn-
est Money Receipt. The defendants proposed closing the 
transaction by using in a Uniiform Reai Estate Contract 
the language arrived at in the Earnest Money Receipt. 
The contract made through the broker ,is indefinite 
and uncertain as to the following material maitters : , 
What subordination was intended and to what kind of 
obligation; 
What was the relationship of the Michigan property 
to the intended subordination; 
What was the amount of the Michigan mortgage in-
tended to be, and .were plaintiffs required to show 
able title; 
When was title to the chattels to pass? 
The next genuine issue is which of the parties breached 
the agreement or refused to go forward? The burden of 
proof was with ithe plaintiffs and the defendants submit 
that the only reasonable procedure was to save the contract 
by closing in the language used in the Earnest Money Re-
ceipt, which was the proposal of the defendants made on 
Jannary 21 and again on February 16, 1967 .. 
And if the agreement was definite and enforceable, 
and if the defendants were at fault in not acceding to the 
interpretations placed on the Earnest Money Receipt by the 
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plaintiffs, then what is the measure of plaintiffs' damage? 
'Dhere is no evidence of the value of the property and there 
is no evidence that plaintiffs made any expenditures in 
good faith in preparation of performance except the sum 
of $160.00 (part of iwhich was not well spent as it did not 
produce evidence of marketable title) 1and the payment of 
$20,000.00 over to the real estate brokers. That deposit is 
recoverable by the plaintiffs in any event and with interest 
if the defendants were at fault. 
If the trial court erred in finding that the contract was 
definite and enforceable, or that the defendants breached 
the contract, the District Court sihould rbe reversed and di-
rected to dismiss the action. 
If the contract were sufficiently definite to be en-
forced, and if the defendants breached the contract, then 
the District Court should be ordered to grant the new trial 
for a determination of plaintiffs' proper damages, with 
instructions as to 'the determin:ation of damages. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARDS & WATKINS 
By Richard L. Bird, Jr. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
720 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
